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Summary findings
A growing body of evidence suggests that the close  domestic service industries), the positive effects on scale
availability of diverse business services is important  for  and productivity in the downstream industry can be
economic growth. Producer services such as managerial  powerful enough that the real wages of domestic skilled
and engineering consulting can provide specialized  labor rise after the liberalization of foreign direct
knowledge to help domestic firms develop at lower unit  investment in service industries.
cost.  In other words, domestic skilled labor and foreign
But these intermediate services are often nontraded,  or  direct investment are partial-equilibrium substitutes in
costly to trade, which may be one reason that cities and  the model but are typically general-equilibrium
industrial complexes form and economic performance  complements.
differs across regions.  *  The increase in the variety of imported services
Because services are costly to trade, foreign services are  leads to increased total factor productivity in
best transferred  through foreign direct investment. This  downstream industries, but the relative impact on
has important  implications for public policy. Policies that  downstream industries depends on how intensively they
affect foreign direct investment differ considerably from  use intermediate services. The differential in effects on
those that affect trade in goods.  productivity in the production  of final goods can be
Markusen,  Rutherford,  and Tarr develop a model of  strong enough that permitting foreign direct investment
services, results from which show that:  can actually affect whether a good is exported  rather
- Liberalizing restraints on inward foreign direct  than being imported.
investment has a powerful positive impact on the income  Policymakers should be aware that protection of a
and welfare of the importing country. The impact is  domestic service industry affects different constituencies
much stronger than in traditional competitive models of  differently. Although domestic capital owners may be
trade in goods.  adversely affected by foreign direct investment, domestic
- Policies to protect domestic skilled labor against  skilled workers in the industry are likely to see demand
competition from imported services can have the  for their skills-and  their real wages-rise.  Moreover,
perverse effect of lowering returns to domestic skilled  downstream industries that use the service
labor-because  while imported services economize on  unambiguously benefit from foreign direct investment
the use of domestic skilled labor (compared with  and their expansion can be surprisingly strong.
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How important are restraints on foreign providers of producer services for welfare and growth in
developing countries? With the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) having been
incorporated into the World Trade Organization and the agreement to discuss these issues after the
Uruguay Round (possibly as part of a New Round), this question has taken on an important policy
dimension.
A growing body of evidence and economic theory suggests that the close availability of a diverse
set of business services is important for economic growth. The key idea in the literature is that a diverse
set (or higher quality set) of business services allows downstream users to purchase a quality adjusted
unit of business services at lower cost.  As early as the 1960s, the urban and regional economics literature
(e.g., Greenfield, 1966; Jacobs, 1969, 1984; Chinitz 1961; Vernon 1960; Stanback, 1979) recognized the
importance of non-tradable intermediate goods (primarily producer seivices produced under conditions of
increasing returns to scale) as an important source of agglomeration externalities which account for the
formation of cities and industrial complexes, and explanations of the difference in economic performance
across regions.
The more recent economic geography literature (e.g., Krugman, 1991; Porter, 1992; Fuj ita,
Krugman and Venables, 1999) has also focused on the fact that related economic activity is economically
concentrated due to agglomeration externalities (e.g., computer businesses in Silicon Valley, ceramic tiles
in Sassuolo, Italy).  Evidence comes from a variety of sources.  Ciccone and Hall (1996) show that firms
operating in economically dense areas are more productive than firms operating in relative isolation.
Caballero and Lyons (1992) show that productivity increases in industries when output of its input
supplying industries increases. Hummels (1995) shows that most of the richest countries in the world are
clustered in relatively small regions of Europe, North America and East Asia, while the poor countries are
-1-spread around the rest of the world. He argues this is partly explained by transportation costs for inputs
since it is more expensive to buy specialized inputs in countries that are far away for the countries where
a large variety of such inputs are located.
As the urban economics literature suggested, we believe that the most natural place to look for
the source of agglomeration economies is producer services. Intermediate goods with low transportation
costs can not play the role required by the urban economics or economic geography theories, since if
transportation costs are low there is little advantage to being close to these input suppliers. But many
business services are either non-traded internationally or provided at much higher costs from a distance
so that there are significant disadvantages to a user of these services from being far from.  the core location
of these activities.' Marshall (1988) shows that in three regions in the United Kingdom (Birmingham,
Leeds and Manchester) almost 80 percent of the services purchased by manufacturers were bought from
suppliers within the same region.  He cites studies which show that firm performance is enhanced by the
local availability of producer services. In developing countries, McKee (1988) argues that the local
availability of producer services is very important for the development of leading industrial sectors.
In this paper we develop a theoretical model that we numerically simulate to
quantitatively assess the importance of liberalization of restraints on foreign providers of producer
services. Based on the evidence we have mentioned, we make three key assumptions in our model: (1)
producer services are non-traded internationally; (2) a larger variety of producer services lower the
quality adjusted costs of these services for downstream industries; 2 and (3) producer services are
produced under conditions of increasing returns to scale. We have already discussed the evidence for
'Empirical  work  has traditionally  treated  producer  services  as non-traded.  See  Kravis and Lipsey  (1988).
Daniels  (1985)  found  that service  providers  charge  higher  prices when  the service  is provided  at a distance.
2Business  services  enhance  the productivity  of final goods production  which expand  and in turn demand
more  business  services.  This is a virtuous  cycle  of forward  and backward  externalities.
-2-stylized facts (1) and (2). Faini (1984) surveys the evidence on increasing returns to scale in producer
services. As emphasized by Romer (1990), many professional services are information intensive which in
itself suggests increasing returns to scale given the non-rival property of information as an input in
production.
We prefer to remain somewhat vague regarding a generic definition of producer services. 3 We
shall, however, provide some elaboration since it explains some of the nuances of our model. The types
of activities we are interested in  include:  (1) managerial services, which improve organizational and
decision-making efficiency.  (2) engineering services, which improve technical efficiency and product
quality.  (3) financial services (not actual trade in capital) which provide expertise in financial
management and decision making.  (4) marketing services which improve firms' abilities to sell or
purchase other goods and services. (5) information services in which the buyer receives some type of
information or knowledge not just listed.
We believe these types of services represent a substantial share of the GDP of modem
economies. Based on national income statistics, all services are about 60 percent of GDP in OECD
countries, and are about 50 to 55 percent of GDP in middle income countries. Business services (which is
perhaps the best indicator of the types of services on which we focus in this paper) are about one-third of
the total of all services. See UNCTAD (1994, tables A.  1 and B. 1).
Many routine services, such as cleaning services have been left off this list quite deliberately.
While unskilled-labor-intensive services might be quantitatively important, they are not generally traded
internationally.  Firms incur costs of doing business abroad, and as such must have advantages over
domestic firms.  Thus we will disregard a wide range of routine services, and concentrate on the list just
presented.
3Intermediate  goods  with  high  transportation  costs could  also  be a soarce of agglomeration  economies,
since  clearly  with  sufficiently  high transportation  costs goods  can become  non-traded  also.
-3-Several concepts emerge from this list.  First, as emphasized above, our services are intermediate
inputs.  Second, the services we are interested in generally involve an exchange of knowledge, which has
been accumulated by the seller through previous investments.  This implies two separate characteristics:
the services of interest here are (a) intensive in skilled labor and other knowledge-based assets, and (b)
involve some sort of scale economies: once painfully or slowly learned, knowledge can be supplied at
low marginal cost.
Third, these services are generally customized to some extent, solving particular problems of the
buyer, and they are not generally good substitutes for the services of other firms.  Thus there is firm-level
product differentiation.  T  here may also be differentiation by firm nationality: two US management
consulting firms may be better substitutes for one another than a US firm is for a Russian firm.
Finally, our services generally require a personal presence in a country or at least personal
contact and discussions between the service provider and the client.  In particular, restrictions on goods
trade only affect service trade indirectly, while restrictions on foreign investment and the movement of
business personnel have major, direct impacts.  Note in particular that insofar as many services of interest
are intensive in knowledge capital or knowledge-based assets, firms may insist on proprietary control of
these assets to prevent their dissipation.  Laws and regulations prohibiting foreign investment may thus
rule out "trade" in many services; i.e., firms may only be willing to provide their services internally
within the firm, not through arm's length contractual arrangements.
In summary then, we are interested in services have the following general characteristics.
(a)  intermediate goods
(b)  intensive in skilled labor and other knowledge capital
(c)  produced with increasing returns.
(d)  differentiated by firm and possibly by firm nationality
(e)  subject to high or prohibitive transactions costs from barriers to foreign ownership,
movement of business personnel, etc.
-4-"Imported" services with these characteristics offer a number of important advantages to
developing or transition economies.  First, they may complement rather than substitute for domestic
producer services, the differentiated-product characteristic just mentioned.  Second, they economize on
scarce domestic skilled labor which is then freed for other uses, the factor-intensity property noted above.
This second property suggests that imported producer services might harm domestic skilled labor and its
accumulation in the long run.  But combined with the first "complements" property, this is far from
obvious as we shall show below.
Third, imported services allow countries to obtain in the present expertise that is not otherwise
available and would take considerable time and/or resources to develop, the scale economies property.  In
a static model, this could be captured by simple scale economies with fixed costs in terms of skilled labor,
or in a dynamic model by a learning-by-doing or investment process which requires a time iag between
skilled-labor inputs and service output.
Fourth, imported services may provide crucial missing inputs which allow a country to produce
and export goods in which the country has a natural comparative advantage except for the missing input.
This has the potential for huge surplus value.  The Arabian gulf may have had huge oil supplies, but
expertise was required to bring it to market.  A few hundred million dollars worth of foreign expertise
likely had a return of many billions of dollars.
The purpose of this paper is to take several steps toward incorporating the types of producer
services just discussed into applied general equilibrium models.  The first step in this process is to adopt a
formal theoretical approach.  Our formulation will build on existing work, including Markusen (1989),
Francois (1990a,b), and Stibora and de Vaal (1995).  The second, and more original, step of this paper
will be to obtain a quantitative assessment of the impact of this approach by embedding it in both static
and dynamic applied general-equilibrium models.  The static model considers the implications of FDI in a
-5-model where the supply of domestic skilled labor is fixed. There have been some prior numerical efforts
to quantitatively assess the implications of international liberalization against foreign service providers
(Brown et al., 1996; Robinson and Wang, 1999). But these studies have not required a domestic presence
by foreign service providers.  Rather they treated service sectors as tradable and assumed that there were
tariffs or the tariff equivalent of non-tariff barriers against foreign services that acted to restrain imported
services in a manner similar to tariffs on goods trade.  In our approach, liberalization of the restraints on
the inputs to foreign service providers will expand the domestic provision of foreign services, but will
have no impact in the prior approaches.
Our dynamic model provides a means of assessing the time and disruption involved in moving
from an initial equilibrium to a new steady-state equilibrium by modeling the transition under consistent
expectations by firms and consumers.  There are two reasons that the transitional dynamics are of
interest.  First, given an assumption of imperfect intersectoral immobility of existing workers, there are
potentially important equity consequences of reform.  Second, if there are wage rigidities or other
distortions in the economy that slow the adjustment of labor, FDI liberalization may generate transitional
unemployment losses which could offset some fraction of the efficiency gains offered by the reform.  For
these reasons, in our dynamic extension we focus on adjustment in the stock of skilled labor within the
economy, assuming that existing workers may be unable to move directly into the FDI enclave.
We believe these template models should provide a useful starting point for the analysis of these
issues in future applications with real data.  Before proceeding, we will mention of a couple of interesting
results which may induce the reader to continue. First, we use a static model to show that liberalization
of rules to permit inward FDI in producer services may imply that these services are general-equilibrium
complements to domestic skilled labor, even though they appear to substitute for domestic skilled labor in
a partial-equilibrium sense.  Thus, it is likely that FDI may foster the accumulation of skilled workers.
Second, allowing inward FDI in producer services may significantly affect the pattern of trade in goods.
-6-As in the "key input" argument above, these services may reverse the direction of trade, permitting the
host country to successfully export advanced products.  Third, we find that the transitional process may
involve substantial changes in the market for skilled labor, particularly if we assume that workers in FDI
enterprises require specialized education. These effects depend on assumptions regarding the productivity
of older skilled workers in the new market for services. If all workers in the new services sector must be
new graduates, the reform imposes a significant burden on older workers, and the transition process could
take a number of years to complete.
The order of the paper is as follows.  In the next section we lay out the basic theoretical model
and some simplifying assumptions. The following section describes the dynamic extension of the model
which is used to examine the economic transition following liberalization.  Section 4 presents a number
of implementational issues involved in the analysis, and section 5 describes some of the results of
numerical simulations.  Section 6 concludes.
2.  Modelling  Trade  and FDI  in Producer  Services
Our basic approach will be to model producer services as intermediate inputs.  These
intermediate inputs will be differentiated from one another and may also be differentiated according to
whether or not they are produced domestically or by foreign firms.  Both types of services are produced
with increasing returns to scale due to fixed costs.
There will be two final goods, X and Y,  and two primary factors available on the domestic
market, S and L.4 S will denote skilled labor and L will denote all other factors, aggregated into a
composite factor to simplify the model. S and L are in fixed aggregate supply and immobile between
4Below we introduce a composite input that must be imported for FDI to occur; this input may be
partly primary factors.
-7-countries.  The production function for Y  is written in Cobb-Douglas form to facilitate comparison with
X, but in the numerical model we allow the more general CES production function.
(1)  Y  =SaYLO  -a)
y  y
Services are an intermediate input into Xproduction.  The composite of all services inputs Z enters
into the production of  X:.
(2)  X  = S ZL  0. z(I  -Qr  P)
x  x  x
Later, in some illustrative simulations, we will assume that in direct S and L requirements, X is skilled-
labor intensive  relative  to  Y, in the sense  that a  /p  >  a  1p.
Services are produced by imperfectly competitive firms. There is a one to one correspondence
between the firm and their differentiated service varieties. There are both domestic and foreign firms
producing services inputs.  Z. is a CES function of ZD and ZM, each of which is in turn a CES function of
the individual ZD and ZMvarieties, zd 1 and zmj  respectively.
(3)  ZX  =  (ZD  Z  +ZMY)I/y
(4)  ZD  = f  zdf  ZM  =  E  zme'
where nd and nm  are the number of domestic and imported service varieties, respectively. The elasticities of
substitution within product groups are:  ud=l/(1-6) and a  =1/(1-e). We require that os  and £ are between 0
and 1, which implies that the elasticities of substitution within product groups exceed unity.
Domestic intermediate inputs ZD are produced using domestic skilled labor and the composite
factor.  Imported services ZMare  produced from domestic skilled labor the composite domestic factor  and
-8-a composite imported factor.  Examples of these imported inputs, which will be denoted V,  are: specialized
technical expertise, advanced technology, management expertise and marketing expertise. The variable V
is thus quite general and denotes a key difference between foreign and domestic production structures.
zd, and zmi  are produced with a fixed and a variable cost.
Because of the two components of cost, it is normal to express technologies for these
differentiated goods by a cost function rather than by a production function.  Let CD and CMbe the cost
function for producing individual domestic and foreign varieties. We impose a symmetry assumption
within firm types, i.e., all foreign firms have identical cost structures, and all domestic firms that operate
have cost structures identical to other domestic firms.  cd  and cm represent unit variable cost functions and
fd andfm represent the fixed costs functions for domestic and foreign varieties respectively.  Let r be the
price of S, w be the price of L, and p, be the price of V. Cost functions for domestic and foreign
intermediates are thus:
(5)  CD(r,  w,zd)  = cd(r,w)zd  +  fd(r,w)
(6)  CM(r,w,pv,zm)  = cm(r,w,p,)zm  +fJin(r,w,p,)
Let nd and ni as variables refer to the number of domestic and foreign service firms active in equilibrium.
Recalling that the derivatives of cost function with respect to the price of factor i is the input demand for
factor i, the market clearing equations for S and L can then be written as:
(7)  L  =L  + L  + n  CD  + n  Cm y  d  w  m  w
(8)  S  =S  + S  + n CD  + n  CM y  x  d  r  m  r
-9-in which Ci and  CJ represents the partial derivatives of unit cost for firm type je {DM  with respect to
the unskilled wage rate and the rental price of skilled labor, respectively.  (By Shephard's lemma, these are
the compensated demand functions.)
The demand side of the economy consists of a representative consumer, who derives income from
factor supplies and possibly from tax revenues (net of subsidies).  Let subscripts c and p distinguish
consumption and production of X and Y. Preferences of the representative consumer are given by
(9)  U  =  U(X,  Y)
The model is closed with a trade balance condition that requires that net exports of X and Y  equal
net payments for foreign services. Let  p  and  p  denote the world prices of Xand  Y(which may differ
from domestic prices if there are taxes or subsidies).  Trade balance is given by:
(10)  p  (X  -X)  P+  *(Y  - Y)  - p*V  0 x  p  c  y  p  c  V
where the demand for foreign services is given by the number of foreign services times the derivative of
the cost function for a given foreign service with respect to the cost of imports::
(11)  V=  n  Cm m  p~
Figure 1 presents a schematic diagram of real flows within the economy.  Domestic factors S and
L are supplied to four production activities.  One of these, foreign producer services uses imported inputs
from abroad, V. Services are inputs to production of X along with S and L.  Domestic production of Xor  Y
may then be supplied to export markets in exchange for the other good and/or as payments for V. A
portion of Xand  Ywill be supplied to the domestic market where it is consumed with imports.
To simplify the interpretation of results, we assume "large-group monopolistic competition."  That
is, individual firms believe they are too small to influence the composite price of their group. As we will
show, it implies that the ratio of the price of services to marginal cost is constant.  Consider first the
-10-marginal product of an individual service zmi  in the aggregate output of the service sector Z,.5 From the
chain rule:
(12)  o  =  dZx  M
dm,  x  GZM am,
From equations 2, 3 and 4 the partial derivatives on the right hand side are:
(13)  -=  (i-  x'  A
'Z~
(14)  dZ  = (ZDr  +ZMr)l'ZM  r  and
d'ZM
(15)  i  zm  zmi =  zmi
Therefore,
(16)  ___&  =X(1-  x  x  X  ZDa + ZMY]r  ZMr-Rzh
Letpx denote the domestic price of X and p,i  denote the price received by the producer of a representative
zm,  Since final Xproduction  is assumed competitive, pz,i is the value of the marginal product of zm, in
producing X.
(17)  Pzm,,  = Px(]-  ax  - f)Sx7tL  Z`at-P[ZDY  + ZMY]r'ZMrE]zm  ¶
Revenue of an individual zm, producer is price times quantity.
(18)  zm,pzpm  = px(I  -6x  )Sx.L  Zx-a_  ZDy + ZM7  ZMy -ZMjg
5 Symmetric results apply to the marginal product of a domestic service.
-I11-Large-group monopolistic competition is the assumption that an individual firm views Zx  as fixed or
parametric, and here by extension views ZM and ZD as fixed. Thus, the individual firm views all variables
on the right hand side of equation (18) as fixed except for its own output zm,. This implies that marginal
revenue takes on a very simple form.
(19)  MRzmi  =  px(I-  ax - f,  x  [ZDy + ZMr]YT1'ZMYe  .EM  =
Setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost implies that the ratio of price to marginal cost is simply
1/.  We have assumed that all foreign varieties have an identical cost structure and the demand for all
foreign varieties is identical. These "symmetry" assumptions imply that the output and price of all foreign
firms that operate will be identical. We can thus write  zm, = zm and prmj  = p,.  for all i.  Similar
conclusions follow for domestic firms.
Then equilibrium for a symmetric group of service firms (zm or zd) is found as the solution to two
equations and two unknowns.  One equation is the individual firm's optimization condition, marginal
revenue equals marginal cost.  A second condition arising from the free-entry condition is that price equals
average cost.  This condition determines the number of firms in equilibrium.  For our type-zm firms, these
two conditions are given as follows (with corresponding equations for the type-zd firms).
(20)  MR  =MC:  PZmF  cm(r,w,p,)
(21)  p  =AC:  pzm  =cm (r,w,pv)  + fm(r,w,p)lzm
Solving these equations to find zm, output per firm, we get:
(22)  1  =  1+  fi-  =  1  fmn  1
()  cm  zm  e  s  cm  zm
-12-and finally
(23)  e  fm(r,w,p,,)  fin(r,w,pv)
(23  zcm(r,w,p-)  m  cm(r,w,mp-
The output of a given variety is larger when fixed costs are larger relative to marginal costs (scale
economies are larger) and when the varieties are better substitutes. Similar results apply for domestic type
firms.
Dual to the output indices in equation 4 are cost functions. When firms minimize the cost of
purchasing foreign (domestic) varieties, a cost of a unit of the composite foreign (domestic) input ZM(ZD)
is:
(24)  CM =  p  m  =  __g
(25)  CD  =  -ad  aG  d  d  _
where pi  is the price of the output of a domestic firm and nd and nm are the number of domestic and
foreign firms.
Substituting the symmetry of the equilibrium into the cost functions for a unit of ZM or ZD,
implies that CMand  CD can be written as:
(26)  CM  =  P.m  and  CD  =Pd
nm-  nX
m  d
Since the elasticities of substitution exceed unity, the cost of obtaining an aggregate unit of foreign or
domestic services decreases as the number of varieties increases. That is, additional varieties convey an
externality on the final goods sector Xby  lowering its costs of obtaining a unit of composite services. The
elasticity of the cost of a composite unit of foreign services with respect to the number of foreign varieties
-13-is (1  -m).  Thus, an additional foreign variety conveys a larger externality on the final goods sector the
better foreign varieties substitute for each other. A similar argument applies for domestic varieties.
Alternatively, the externality can be viewed from the primal (equation 4). Symmetry implies that
(27)  ZD  =  n'  1 zd  ZM  =  nm  Ezm
d 
The cost of purchasing the output of domestic firms is nd*zd*pzd, which increases in proportion to the
number of fimrs. But, since 8<1, the effective supply to the firm increases more than proportionately with
the number of firms.
Note in the special case in which y = 8 = s and zm = zd, that Zx  can be written as:
(28)  Z  =(nd  + nm)"  z  z =zm  = zd
in which case domestic and imported firms, while differentiated, are perfect substitutes at the margin.
A final set of assumptions needed to complete the model formulation relate to the specification of
the external sector, and in particular the endogeneity of prices.  For our purposes, we will begin with a
"small country assumption", that prices to our country are fixed.  It is clear what this means with respect to
X and Y, but less clear with respect to foreign producer services.  We assume that there are a large number
of potential foreign firms in production in the rest of the world. A fixed cost is needed to enter the
domestic market (fin).  Foreign firms will enter up to the point where the local markup revenues cover this
fixed cost.  In other words, the domestic market has no "world" effect on the number of multinationals.  In
terms of Figure 1, the "World Markets" block exchanges X, Y  and V  at fixed prices.  This assumption
would generally not hold in a "large-country case", with firm level scale economies.  In such a model,
excess markup revenues contribute to firm-level fixed costs, and the number of multinational firms
becomes endogenous to policy changes in one country (Markusen and Venables, 1998, 2000).
-14-3.  Modeling Transitional Dynamics
In this section we present an extension of the static model above which we employ in the dynamic
simulations.  In this analysis we assume that liberalization of FDI in services is an unanticipated policy
reform and the economy is initially on a steady-state growth path with FDI prohibited. 6 We calibrate the
dynamic model to precisely the same dataset employed to illustrate the static model. The model assumes a
growth in new vintage labor and a utility discount factor consistent with a balanced baseline GDP growth
rate of 2% per annum and an interest rate of  5% per annum.
Savings and investment are determined implicitly by the consumption decisions of a  forward-
looking representative agent who allocates wealth to maximize intertemporal welfare:
(29)  W =AEV', (XC, Yc 
Consistent with a labor market in which workers enter the workforce at age 20 and retire at age 70,
we assume an exogenous retirement rate of 2% per year. Along the dynamic growth path new vintage
workers enter the labor market in each period, and they must choose whether to enter school or the
unskilled workforce.  School graduates subsequently choose either to work in the domestic or FDI service
industry.  The new-vintage labor market clearance condition, where n is the number of new workers, is:
(30)  e  + S  0 = n
in which P>1 reflects diminishing returns in the production of skilled workers, i.e. marginal graduates are
less productive than the earlier participants.'  New skilled workers (new graduates) may subsequently
choose to enter the domestic or FDI (multinational) skilled labor markets:
(31)  sD  +  sM  =  s
t  I  I
6  Unlike Tarr and Rutherford [1998], this model is based on an exogenous growth rate in the
workforce.  Product variety effects are defined on a per-capita basis.
' In this model unskilled workers are measured in units proportional to population, but skilled
workers are measured in efficiency units.  For our reference calculations we take 1=1  0/7.
-15-while the unskilled workforce likewise evolves:
(32)  Lill  = X L,  + Q,
We assume in the dynamic model that the cost of producing a new skilled worker for the domestic or FDI
markets is identical.
Given a dynamic model, we have the capacity to assess the adjustment costs of workers. Cross-
country evidence on the adjustment costs of labor indicates that the social adjustment costs of trade and
FDI liberalization are typically rather low relative to the fears of policy-makers, unless there are
significant labor market distortions present.  Moreover, even the private costs of adjustment are low for
workers who were not earning rents (Matusz and Tarr, forthcoming). Restrictions on the ability of firms to
terminate labor and other labor market distortions that limit mobility, as well as a poor climate for
investment (due to macroecomic instability or lack of the rule of law) can, however, lead to prolonged
periods of adjustment to trade and FDI liberalization for labor.
In this paper we take a proxy for these various distortions that can lead to large adjustment costs
of workers. We assume that some fraction of existing skilled workers have human capital that is specific to
the firm type in which they work and cannot be trained for the other type firms, i.e., a fraction of the
workforce is unable to gain employment in foreign firms.  (All new workers can freely choose between
domestic and multinational firms.)  The base year supply of skilled workers is then divided between those
working in the domestic and multinational firms:
(33)  SO  = SD  + SM (33)  3~~0  0  0
and there is an upper bound on the share working in the multinational sector:
(34)  O  < (  SO
In the central scenarios, we take q =0.5.  Subsequent to the initial reallocation of skilled workers across
the two sectors, these human capital stocks evolve according to the standard capital accounting
relationship:
-16-5 k  = X Sk  + S k  ke(DM
(35)  St+,M
When skilled workers are immobile ((p is small), there may be an initial disparity in real wages between
workers in different types of firms during the adjustment process. 8 As new skilled workers enter the
workforce, they move into the sector paying the highest return, and  wage differences between foreign and
domestic firms disappear.  The model formulation in a complementarity format does not rule out
"bang-bang" adjustment paths, so that during a transition period where (34) is binding,, all new graduates
adopt jobs in the FDI service sector.
In differentiating domestic and multinational skilled workers, we replace equation (8) by two
equations, one for domestic workers:
(36)  SD  = S  + SD  +n  CD
t  Yt  xt  dtc  rt
and a second for skilled workers employed in multinational firms:
(37)  S  = SX  n  Cm t  xt  Mt  rt
Prior to liberalization, skill-intensive services (Z) and skill-intensive goods (X) are produced using
only domestic inputs. In the long-run, following reform, both are produced using both domestic and
multinational inputs (see equation 3).  During the transition, however, the relative cost of new- versus old
production techniques determines how these goods are supplied.  During the transition, the supply of X is
therefore the sum of production from conventional domestic sources and new multinational finns:
(38)  X  (S  )x  (L  D)r  (z  D)  r  +  (SC)  (LP)x  (Z) 
s Since the skilled workers remain employed during the transition, the adjustment costs are
private not social.
-17-4.  Implementation Issues
Before illustrating how the model described above can be coded into an applied general-
equilibrium model, we present a brief discussion of some important practical issues.
(a)  Initially - inactive activities  Often AGE models avoid initial calibrations in which there
are no initially-inactive production activities or trade links.  Or, if there is an initially inactive trade link
(aircraft exports from Sri Lanka to the US), the link is omitted from the model: i.e., an inactive link is
always inactive.
In our case, this is not an appropriate procedure.  We very much want to consider initial situations
in which FDI is prohibited in a sector, and liberalization opens the closed sector.  In a complementarity
framework this is not a technical difficulty. The difficulty is economic.  We would like to know how
profitable the excluded activity would be if the barrier were removed.  This will obviously be very
quantitatively important to the results, which can range from zero in a perfectly competitive model (the
barrier was redundant, the activity is not profitable with no barrier) to extremely high values.  But there are
no easily obtainable data for the "shadow price" of these restrictions.  Survey evidence from multinational
firms might be one source of information.
(b)  Firm-level production differentiation  We have no good estimates of the extent to which
the outputs of firms in a given sector are good or poor substitutes for one another.  Note that in the large-
group monopolistic-competition model, the degree of production differentiation is closely related to scale
economies, or more precisely the ratio of fixed costs to average costs.  Thus if one were to take the model
seriously, one could use possible data on scale economies to estimate the elasticity of substitution among
different firms.  This estimate will of course be of considerable importance to the results: a lower elasticity
of substitution implies lower externalities to the final good sector, as explained above.
(c)  Differentiation by region of origin  If we really believe that the essence of production
differentiation is firm-level only, and that firms are symmetric but imperfect substitutes for one another,
-18-then the three parameters y, 5, and E in (3) and (4) should be identical. But is it really believable that the
elasticity of substitution between two Russian management consulting firms is the same as the elasticity of
substitution between one Russian and one American firm?  In the model presented here we will assume
that 5 = E,  but that this number is greater than or equal to y.  Substitution across firm type (domestic and
foreign) is less than or equal to substitution within a type.
(d)  Bang-Bana Solutions We have chosen a structure of production that provides for firm-
type product differentiation with national differences (see equation (3)). When the elasticities of
substitution are equal at all levels, i.e., y = 6 = E , the CES function reduces to strictly firm-level product
differentiation. In this case, the final good sector is completely indifferent between a domestic of foreign
variety.  Decreasing nm  by one is perfectly matched in final sector productivity by increasing nd by one;
only the total number of varieties matters. If the costs of producing domestic or foreign services are not
that different, and they are collectively a small part of total GDP, then we can get bang-bang solutions in
which a small change in relative costs shift us from only domestic services being produced to only foreign
services.  This has indeed occurred in our simulations.
On the other hand, we have set y less than 8 = E (which may be justified by economic arguments
as noted above). In this case, domestic and foreign varieties have different impacts on the productivity of
the final goods sector. The total number of varieties is not all that is important, but also the share of
foreign and domestic varieties. In particular, the marginal productivity of either the domestic or foreign
aggregate ZD and ZM goes to infinity as its share goes to zero. Then, as long as either foreign or domestic
varieties are permitted to be produced and sold, they will both exist in the market and we will not have
bang-bang solutions.
-19-5.  Simulation Results
Table  1 shows some simulation results from the static model. In these calculations, the elasticity
of substitution among services of one firm type (domestic or multinational) is set at 5 while the elasticity
of substitution between firm types is set at 3.
The model is benchmarked such that key variables have the values of one or zero initially.  The
first column of Table I shows results when imports of V are banned and hence ZM is zero.  The country
exports Y  and imports X, and there is no trade in V  (trade balance requires that the last three entries in a
column sum to zero).  The prices for skilled and unskilled labor are real prices, the nominal price divided
by the consumer price index.
Columns 2-6 of Table 1 gives results for counterfactuals with alternative values ofp,.  Some
explanation of this exercise is required and we begin first with the interpretation of alternative values ofp,
One interpretation of p, is the international "term-of-trade" for V. A lowerp,  denotes better terms of
trade insofar as how much X and/or Y  the country must pay for the imported input V. Alternatively, p,  can
be interpreted as a domestic price that must be paid for imported V,  with this price above the foreign
supply price due to a regulatory barrier or red tape.  The difference between p, and the foreign supply
price is captured by the foreign supplier or is dissipated on regulatory procedures or red tape.  That is, p, is
the real resource cost to the domestic economy of an imported unit of V. From the point of view of the
domestic economy, either interpretation is the same: real resources are sacrificed in the differences
between p, and a lower foreign supply price.  Note however that this way of modeling the barrier is not
equivalent to a tax or a bribe.  In those case, the difference between p, and the foreign supply price is
capture by domestic agents, either the government or the domestic bribe taker.
Column 2 of Table  I in which p, = 1 is a very important special case and requires some
explanation.  Let w, and ro be the initial equilibrium values of w and r in column  1, where foreign FDI is
-20-banned.  For zd = zm (domestic and imported varieties produced in the same quantity), p, =1 is the value
of P, that satisfies the equality
(39)  cd(r0,w0)zd  +fd(r 0,w 0)  = cm(r 0,w0,p,)zm  +fm(r 0,w0 P,)
That is, at the initial prices with FDI-banned, pv  = 1  means that cost of one unit of output from a
representative foreign firm is equal to cost of a unit of output from a domestic firm.  This is an interesting
case because, in traditional competitive models, no entry would occur and the initial no-FDI equilibrium
would continue to be an equilibrium once entry is permnitted.  However, as explained above, when foreign
and domestic varieties are differentiated, the marginal productivity of foreign varieties is unbounded in the
initial no-FDI situation. Therefore, we must have some entry by foreign firms to reduce the value of their
marginal product to their marginal costs. Given the initial high marginal productivity of the banned FDI, it
can be expected to convey a large productivity boost.
Column 2 of Table I confirms that there is a strong productivitv and welfare boost even at this
price of V. An entering zm producer confers an "externality" effect on zd producers raising the price
received by an individual producer of zd for a given demand for aggregate  ZD (symmetric equation to
(17)).  Entry of more zd and/or zm firms occurs until factor prices adjust to reach a new equilibrium.  The
result in column 2 (100%) is a pure variety or productivity effect; i.e., in a competitive model without
scale economies this second column would be identical to the first.  The second column in fact shows a
welfare increase of 2.5%.
One of the most interesting results is that the real wage of skilled labor rises by 7.0%.  This is an
effects suggested earlier, in which the substitution effect away from domestic skilled labor (V economizes
on domestic skilled labor in producing ZM) is outweighed by a scale effect.  Imported services produce a
sort of productivity effect that lowers the cost of final output and increases the X-sector's direct demand for
skilled labor.  A final interesting result in the second column is change in the trade pattern.  Imports of X
-21-are eliminated due to the economy's increased ability to produce it domestically, and trade consists of a
small export of Y  to pay for imported V.
As the price of V  falls, these results are amplified.  This lower price for V  may be economically
reasonable, insofar as foreign multinationals have made large sunk investments and are willing to supply V
at a low marginal cost when competing with one another.  The number of domestic service firms continues
to fall as the price of V  falls, but this fall in demand for domestic skilled labor is outweighed by the scale
effect in Xproduction  so that the real wage of skilled labor continues to rise.  In the right-hand column of
Table 1, the skilled-labor wage has risen by 40% while the real wage of the composite factor has fallen by
4%.  These results are particularly dramatic if we want to think of V as largely consisting of imported
skilled workers: they are clearly a general-equilibrium complement to domestic skilled labor.
Note the reversal of the pattern of trade in goods in the right-hand two columns of Table 1. When
V is sufficiently cheap, the country imports Yand exports X.  Finally, we might draw attention to the very
large changes in welfare in Table 1. The model is calibrated so that imported services ZMhave only a
10% value share in X production at the initial price of 1.0 for V,  and V has only a 40% value share in
producing ZM.  Thus Vhas a 4.0% value share inXinitially.  Yet a fall in the cost of Vto 20% of its initial
value produces a 14.6% increase in welfare, a result that is due to scale/variety effect.
Earlier, we noted that the entry of a new service producer confers a positive productivity boost or
"externality"  on existing producers.  To put is somewhat differently, a well-known result in this type of
model is that the number of firms in market equilibrium is below the optimal number.  In Figure 2, we
therefore present results when we impose a tax/subsidy on imported V. Figure 2 uses column five of Table
1 (Price of V is 40%), and welfare changes are measured relative to the no-tax reference point (i.e., 1.07 in
Table I is the basis for equivalent variations in income depicted in Figure 2).  Figure 2 shows that the
optimal tax on V is in fact negative, the optimum is a subsidy of about 25%.
-22-There are two opposing effects of a tax on V (the same would apply to a tax on zm).  Domestic
service "varieties" are produced with increasing returns, imperfect competition, and sell for a price in
excess of marginal cost. A tax on imported services or intermediate goods induces a substitution effect in
favor of domestic "varieties".  Each sells for a price in excess of marginal cost and so the domestic
economy captures a surplus on the extra varieties.  This effect shows up in models of differentiated final
goods and leads to a positive optimal tax.
However, in addition to this "substitution" effect there is a "scale" effect.  Imported varieties have
an "externality" effect on domestic producers at constant prices (prices do not stay constant).
Alternatively, the extra imported varieties could be thought of as having a productivity-enhancing effect
on final production: final production exhibits increasing returns in the range of intermediates.  There is no
general theoretical result as to which effect will dominate, the latter does in this model. But the effect is
clear in column 5 of Table 1 (p, = 0.4), the value which is used in Figure 2.  The sum of the indices for the
domestic and foreign firms is 1.53 (0.11 + 1.42), greater than the value of one in the benchmark.  The
productivity or scale effect is reflected in the fact that the real prices of both factors increase relative to the
benchmark.  A related result is found in Lopez-de-Silanes, Markusen, and Rutherford (1994), where the
authors find that the optimal tariff on auto parts imported into Mexico is negative.  For theoretical
foundations of this problem, see Markusen (1989, 1990).
The dynamic transition could require significant changes in the labor market, as illustrated in
Figure 3.  In this simulation, based on parameter values as described above, the transition to a new steady
state takes roughly 5 years.  These calculations assume qp=0.5,  so that half of the existing skilled
workforce can enter the multinational sector in year 0. During much of this time, new entrants to the
skilled labor market choose to work in the FDI sector.
The reason for this corner solution is indicated in Figure 4. In the long run, the wages for skilled
workers in domestic firms (wED)  and wages in FDI firms (wtM)  are equalized, but during the transitional
-23-process, our assumption of imperfect mobility results in substantial differences in these wages. As
indicated in the figure, liberalization raises the return to skilled workers in the FDI sector by nearly 15%
while the return to skilled workers in the domestic sector falls monotonically over two year period before
beginning to recover.  During this time the unskilled wage (wtu) rises by over 10%.
Figure 5 indicates that immediately following reform, the number of domestic firms (nd,) falls by
60%, and thereafter this number declines to 20% of the original number.  The number of multinational
firms (n.d  more than compensates however, as the total number of firms in the economy increases to 20%
higher than the baseline number after 5 years.
Figure 6 indicates how trade in goods (Xand 1) and imported services (V) adjust through the
transition process.  The initial impact on service-intensive trade is to produce substantial imports in X.  As
the number of FDI service firms rises, however, imports of these goods decline until, after 5 years, the
economy becomes a net exporter of X.  On the new steady-state, both X and Y are exported, and only V is
imported.
The rate of transition depends crucially on parameter (p, the assumed mobility of skilled workers
between domestic and multinational firms as shown in Figure 7. This figure reports the percentage change
in the wage of skilled workers in the domestic services sector.  When the mobile fraction of skilled
workers in the initial workforce ((p) increase to 0.6, the return to these workers increases almost
immediately.  When the fraction is smaller, the wage of skilled workers falls and remains low for a
number of years.  Our formulation does not incorporate retraining activities, so that in the case of low
mobility, our results overstate the transition costs. These results, however, could be expected in an
economy with significant labor market distortions or an especially poor climate for investment.
-24-6.  Conclusions
Although there is a clear trend among developing countries to liberalize their policies with respect
to inward foreign direct investment (UNCTAD, 1995, 272-275), many developing countries continue to
impose restraints on FDI in general and in services in particular. These policies may be motivated by the
fear that foreign service providers will harm the domestic skilled workers that provide these services in
domestic firms. For example, examination of the commitments on services of WTO members in their
GATS schedules reveals that 32 countries (mainly in Africa and Latin America) have scheduled
"horizontal restrictions" that require foreign firms to use and train domestic skilled workers. In many cases
these restraints may impede the foreign firm from importing the specialized people it would desire.
In this paper we have examined the impact of the liberalization of policies to allow the formation
of foreign firms that provide intermediate services. The foreign service providers import an input (which
we interpret as a composite of foreign skilled labor and specialized technology), and economize on the use
of domestic skilled labor compared to domestic firms that provide the substitute service.
We first examined this issue with a comparative static model and showed that liberalization could
lead to gains between 3 and 15 percent of GDP, depending on parameter assumptions. These are very
large gains relative to what we might expect from a comparative static model. The source of these large
gains is that additional intermediate service firms increase the productivity of the final goods sector that
uses these firms services as intermediate inputs. More service firms allow final goods producers to use
more specialized expertise, in the same way that larger markets allow for more specialized machine tools.
We have also constructed a dynamic model, which allows us to assess the transition path to a new
steady state growth path and the adjustment costs. In our model, while the total number of firms and total
factor productivity in the economy increases steadily from the first period, for the first 5 years the
domestic industry progressively declines. Consequently, all new domestic entrants to the skilled labor
force enter foreign firms, where real wages are higher for the first 5 years. Eventually the domestic
-25-industry stabilizes (the marginal product of domestic firms increases as the number of domestic firms
declines). The potential losers during the transition are skilled workers in the domestic industry. These
workers incur losses only when we make rather strong assumptions regarding the immobility of skilled
workers and we assume that their human capital is specific to domestic firms and that only new entrants to
the workforce can be trained to work in the foreign owned firms. When we assume that 50% of the
workforce is immobile, after 5 years  real wages of skilled workers are equalized across foreign and
domestic owned service firms and are higher as a result of the liberalization of FDI in the service sector.
One of the more interesting results of the comparative static model is that the real wage of
domestic skilled labor increases with liberalization of policies against foreign service providers, and the
more foreign firms there are in the domestic market the more the real wage of domestic skilled workers
increases. Thus, despite the fact that foreign firms import an input (J)  and thereby use domestic skilled
labor less intensively than domestic firms, additional foreign firms benefit domestic skilled labor. The
reason is that additional foreign firms lower the cost of the intermediate service product in final goods
production and thereby increase the relative importance of the final good sector (X), which uses services
relatively intensively. Thus, in a general equilibrium sense, domestic skilled labor and the specialized
foreign input V are complements. One possible interpretation of this result is that the policies of certain
developing countries discussed above that restrain the import of foreign inputs or force foreign
multinationals to use domestic skilled factors in place of foreign inputs may not only result in lost national
income, but may hurt the factor of production they are designed to assist.
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-29-Table 1: Simulations for various prices of V, the imported input for FDI
in services (skilled labor, blueprints, patents, etc.)
PRICE OF V (units of foreign exchange)*
VARIABLES  +INF  1.00  0.80  0.60  0.40  0.20
Welfare  1.00  1.03  1.03  1.05  1.07  1.15
Real wage of
skilled labor  1.00  1.07  1.07  1.11  1.14  1.40
Real wage of  1.00  0.99  1.01  1.00  1.02  0.96
composite factor
No. of domestic  1.00  0.45  0.35  0.24  0.11  0.03
service firms
No. of foreign  0.00  0.51  0.67  0.98  1.42  2.80
service  firms
Net imports of X  1.00  0.00  0.00  -0.41  -0.63  -3.01
Net imports ofY  -1.00  -0.26  -0.31  0.00  0.11  2.18
Net imports of V  0.00  0.26  0.31  0.41  0.52  0.83
*To interpret the price of V, the export of one unit of Y earns one unit of foreign
exchange, and the export of X earns 0.95 units of foreign exchange.
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-37-Appendix A: Formulating the Static Model in GAMS/MPSGE
In this first appendix  we will describe  and implement  a numerical  model  using MPSGE
(Rutherford,  1999). As we will see, there is one cumbersome  feature  about  using MPSGE  in this
framework,  but we believe  that is outweighed  in more complicated  models  with real data due to its
immense  advantages  in data handling  and savings  in coding.
The model follows  the formulation  in Figure 1, and the GAMS  file is given  at the end of this
appendix. Because  the variable  associated  with a commodity  in MPSGE  is its price, we will follow a
convention  of beginning  each commodity  name with the letter "P". This also prevents  a confusion
between  a production  sector  or activity  and the good(s)  it produces.
Primary  factors  are skilled  labor (PS) and a second  composite  factor (PL). These  are supplied  to
four "industries",  the Y sector  (producing  only output  PY), the X sector  (producing  only output  PX), the
domestic  service sector  ZD (producing  PZD)  and the foreign  service  sector  ZM (producing  PZM).
Services  are only used in the production  of PX and not in the production  of PY. Because  of a technical
problem  involving  the slope of a CES isoquant  near  zero of one input,  we actually  specify  two X activities:
XD for producing  PX when foreign  services  are not available  and XM for producing  PX when they are.
This is summarized  as follows:
Final  Production  Activities
Y  Competitive  industry  that produces  PY using PS and PL. Assumed  to be PL intensive.
XD  Produces  PX using PS, PL, and PZD (active  when  foreign  services  are not available).
Assumed  to be PS intensive  in primary  factors.
XM  Produces  PX using  PS, PL, PZD, and PZM  (active  when foreign  services  are available).
Assumed  to be PS intensive  in primary  factors. Initially inactive  in our benchmark.
W  Welfare  activity  produces  "utility  good" PW using PX and PY (the activity level W is the
true welfare index  for the economy)
Turning  to trade activities,  there is a dummy  good called  "foreign  exchange",  PFX. For activities
permit  the exchange  of goods  for one another.
Trade  Activities  for Goods
TEY  Exports  of PY: PY produces  PFX. Initially  active  in our benchmark.
TMX  Imports  of PX: PFX produces  PX. Initially  active  in our benchmark.
-38-TEX  Exports of PX:  PX produces PFX.  Initially inactive in our benchmark.
TMY  Imports of PY:  PFX produces PY.  Initially inactive in our benchmark.
The intermediate services are more complicated due to scale economies and imperfect
competition.  For domestic services, there are two activities, ZD and ND.  ND is an activity for producing
the fixed costs needed by a single ZD firm (good PFD).  In addition, there is an agent called ENTRED
(entrepreneur domestic, corresponding to no real agent), who receives markup revenue and demands fixed
costs (PZD) produced by activity ND.  The budget balance condition for ENTRED generates a fee-entry
equilibrium.
Because MPSGE requires production sectors (activities) to have constant returns to scale, a tricks
in needed to incorporate product variety into the model. This is done by an auxiliary quantity adjustment
variable, ZDQADJ and a price adjustment variable, ZDPADJ.  We will describe this more in a minute, but
first let us summarize the activities, agents and auxiliary variables associated with the production of
domestic services, PZD.
Production Activities, Agents. and Auxiliarv Variables for PZD
ZD  Produces PZD using units of RL and RS. The price adjustment variables ZDPADJ is
applied on this activity.  The production of Z is assumed to be skilled-labor intensive
relative to both PX and PY.  Markup is applied on this activity's  inputs (the markup
derived in the text is defined on a gross basis, but in the model this is converted to a net
basis to apply to inputs.)
ND  Produces PFD, the fixed costs for each domestic variety.  The activity level ND is an
index of the degree of product differentiation (number of firms nd in equilibrium).  Same
factor intensity as ZD.
ENTRED  Dummy agent who receives markup revenues and demands fixed costs.
ZDQADJ  Auxiliary variable which accounts for product variety effects.
ZDPADJ  Tax/subsidy adjustment that ensures that the value of sector ZD output equals the value of
true output.
Exactly the same activities, agents, and auxiliary variables apply to production of foreign services,
switch the letter M for the letter D, with two exceptions:
Activities for Foreian Services that Differ from Domestic Services
-39-ZM  Produces PZM using inputs of PS, PL, and PV (imported inputs). ZM economizes on
skilled labor (implicitly using foreign skilled labor and knowledge-based assets) relative
to ZD.  The markup is applied on inputs to this activity.
NM  Produces PFM, the fixed costs for each foreign variety.  The activity level NM is an index
of the degree of product differentiation (number of firms nm  in equilibrium).  Same factor
intensity as ZM.
Figure 8 explains the coding of the services sectors in more detail (it applies to both ZD and ZM
so for economy the distinction is dropped in this diagram). Beginning in the top center, there is a sector
producing "pseudo" Z, defined as Z' = nz, and therefore having constant returns to scale, as opposed to
"true" Z, Z = nl"z.  The fixed markup produces revenues assigned to an agent ENTRE. ENTRE takes
these revenues and demand fixed costs.  The equilibrium activity level N, for production of fixed costs, is
an index of the number of firms active in equilibrium.
So now we know Z' and n, and can therefore find Z.  Units in the numerical model are chosen
such that z = 1 (zd and zm) which is a constant, so Z = Z(l/e). ZQADJ is then the difference between these
two values, ZQADJ = Z*(-8)  Z.  This amount is then "given" to the representative consumer, CONS, in an
endowment field in the demand block, CONS (the consumer does not consume this amount, he/she sells it
for X and Y).  Thus the total amount of Z in the economy is the true amount Z = Z*  + ZQADJ.
But now we have a problem, in that the value of payments for Z received by producers is not equal
to the value of Z to consumers.  We correct this by an ad valorem subsidy rate, ZPADJ.  This is set so that
the value of Z to consumers equals the payments for Z' receive by producers.
(40)  pzZ  = pZ  pz(l  + ZPADJ)Z*
(41)  ZPADJ  (Z*£-  Z_  )Z*  = ZQADJIZ*
-40-Figure 8  Incorporating Monopolistic Competition into a GAMS/MPSGE Model
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One final mystery needs to be explained (well, at least one). Note that the reference quantities in
the Q  fields in the production block for XM, 7.07 for PZD and PZM.  These were arrived at by using the
production  in(3).  If 20 units of ZD (used in production  block  XD) yield a given  amount  of Zd  with ZM =
0, how much ZD and ZM (equal amounts of each) could deliver the same amount of Zf given y = 2/3
(elasticity of substitution = 3) in (3)?  The answer is ZD = ZM =  7.07.  This amount is of course less than
half of 20 due to ZD and ZM being imperfect substitutes.
-41-This completes the discussion of the model. Scalar parameter ZDI is a logical flag used to turn on
and turn off activities XM, ZM, and NM.  In the first solution to the model, FDI=O,  corresponding to the
prohibition of imported services.  Subsequently, FDI is set to a positive value and FDICOST is used to set
the cost of foreign services in the new equilibrium.
The computer code follows:
$TITLE  Basic  FDI  in  services  model
*  Monopolistic-Competition:
*  Elasticity of sub among firms of one type: 5
Elasticity of substitution between firm types:  3
$ONTEXT
Production Sectors  I  Consumers
Mkts  I  X  ZD  ND  ZM  eNM  Y  TEY  TMX TEX TEY  W  ICONS  ED  EM
PX  I  80  20  -100 I
PZD  j  -25  25  l
PFD  I  5  I  -5
PZM  l
PFM
py  I  120  -20  -100 I
PW  I  200  1-200
RL  1  -20  -4  -1  -90  1  115
RS  I  -35  -16  -4  -30  1  85
PFX  I  20  -20  _




FDI  Control parameter for FDI  /0/,
FDICOST  FDI cost index  /1/,
EDELTA  Domestic firm demand elasticity  /5/,
EEPSILON  FDI firm demand elasticity  /5/,
EGAMMA  Armington elasticity  /3/,
RO  Baseline interest rate  /0.05/,
GO  Baseline GDP growth rate  /0.01/,
DO  Depreciation rate for labor  /0.05/,
ALPHA  Fixed-factor  value share in schooling  /0.2/
GAMMA  Armington elasticity parameter
DELTA  Domestic firm elasticity paraemter
EPSILON  FDI firm elasticity paraemter
MKD  Markup by domestic firms
MKeM  Markup by foreign firms;
*  Elasticity exponents and markups:
GAMMA  - 1 - 1/EGAMMA;
DELTA  - 1 - 1/EDELTA;
EPSILON - 1  - 1/EEPSILON;
DISPLAY EPSILON, DELTA, GAMMA;
MKD  =  1  - DELTA;




C  ! Consumption  (static  welfare)  level
x  Activity  level  for  sector  X
y  Activity  level  for  sector  Y
ZD  Activity  level  for  sector  Z domestic  services
ZM$FDI  Activity  level  for  sector  Z MNE  services
ND  Number  of domestic  service  firms
NM$FDI  !Number  of MNE  service  firms
V$FDI  MNE  import  level
TMX  Activity  level  for  imports  of X
TEY  Activity  level  for  exports  of Y
TMY  ! Activity  level  for  imports  of  Y
TEX  Activity  level  for  imports  of X
$COMMODITIES:
PC  ! Price  index  for  consumption
PX  Price  index  for  commodity  X
PY  Price  index  for  commodity  Y
RL  Return  to  unskilled  labor  L  (composite)
RS  ! Return  to skilled  labor  S  (skilled  labor)
PZD  ! Price  index  for  commodity  Z domestic
PFD  P  Price  of  fixed  costs  for  domestic  services
PZM$FDI  ! Price  index  for  commodity  Z MNE
PFM$FDI  ! Price  of  fixed  costs  for  MNE  services
PV$FDI  ! Price  of MNE  import
PFX  Price  index  for  foreign  exchange
$CONSUMERS:
CONS  Income  level  for  consumer  CONS
ENTRED  Dummy  agent  for  domestic  services  (receives  markups)
ENTREM$FDI  ! Dummy  agent  for  MNE  services  (receives  markups)
$AUXILIARY:
ZDQADJ  X  Quantity  adjustment  (positive  when  X>1)
ZDPADJ  X  output  subsidy  rate  (positive  when  X>1)
ZMQADJ$FDI  ! Z Quantity  adjustment  (positive  when  Z>1)
ZMPADJ$FDI  Z output  subsidy  rate  (positive  when  Z>1)
ZDT  ! Variable  to prevent  divide  by  zero  when  ZD =  0









*  MKD  is the  markup  defined  on  a gross  basis.  It  is
*  converted  to a  net  basis  when  it applies  to  inputs:
$PROD:ZD  s:l
O:PZD  Q:  20  A:CONS  N:ZDPADJ  M:-l
I:RL  Q:  4  A:ENTRED  T:(MKD/(l-MKD))
I:RS  Q:  16  A:ENTRED  T:(MKD/(l-MKD))
$PROD:ND  s:l  '
O:PFD  Q:  5
I:RL  Q:  1
I:RS  Q:  4




I:PZD  Q:20  P:(1/DELTA)




I:PZD  Q:7.07  P:(l/DELTA)  a:
I:PZM  Q:7.07  P:(1/EPSILON)  a:
$PROD:ZM$FDI  s:l
O:PZM  Q:20  A:CONS  N:ZMPADJ  M:-1
I:RL  Q:  4  A:ENTREM  T:(MKM/(1-MKM))
I:RS  Q:  8  A:ENTREM  T:(MKM/(1-MKM))
I:  PV  Q:(8*FDICOST)  A:ENTREM  T:(MKM/(1-MKM)J  P:  (1/FDICOST)
$PROD:NM$FDI  s:I
o:PFM  Q:  5
I:RL  Q:  1
I:RS  Q:  2

























ZDQADJ  =E=  ZD  *  (ND**(1/DELTA-1)  - 1);
$CONSTRAINT:ZDPADJ
ZDPADJ  *  ZDT  =E=  ZDQADJ;
$CONSTRAINT:ZDT




ZMQADJ  =E=  ZM  *  (NM**(l/EPSILON-1)  - 1);
SCONSTRAINT:ZMPADJ$FDI
ZMPADJ  *  ZMT  =E=  ZMQADJ;
SCONSTRAINT:ZMT$FDI
ZMT  =G=  ZM;
$OFFTEXT
$SYSINCLUDE  mpsgeset  BASIC
-44-V.L  =  0;
*  Adjust  bounds  so that  the  auxiliary  variables  can  take  on
*  negative  values:
ZMQADJ.LO  =  -1;  ZMPADJ.LO  - -1;
ZDQADJ.LO  =  -1;  ZDPADJ.LO  - -1;
ZMT.LO  =  0.01;  ZDT.LO  =  0.01;
ZMT.L  =  0.01;  ZDT.L  =  1;
TEX.L  =  0;  TMY.L  0;
PZD.L  =  1.25;  PZM.L  .8777;
$INCLUDE  BASIC.GEN
SOLVE  BASIC  USING  MCP;
PARAMETER  RESULTS  Static  Equilibria  for  Alternative  FDICOST;
SET  COST  /"inf","100","80","60',"40","20"/;
FDI  =  0;
FDICOST  - 1.2;
LOOP(COST,
$INCLUDE  BASIC.GEN
SOLVE  BASIC  USING  MCP;
FDI  =  1;
FDICOST  =  FDICOST  - 0.2;
RESULTS("welfare",COST)  =  C.L;
RESULTS("rs",COST)  =  RS.L/PC.L;
RESULTS("rl",COST)  =  RL.L/PC.L;
RESULTS("nd",COST)  =  ND.L;
RESULTS("nm",COST)  =  NM.L;
RESUT.TS("m_x",COST)  =  20  *  TMX.L  - 19  *  TEX.L;
RESULTS("m_y",COST)  =  20  TMY.L  - 20  *  TEY.L;
RESULTS("m_v",COST)  =  V.L;
RESULTS("nm","INF")  =  0;
DISPLAY  results;
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